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Some Conflictin Trends in Satellite
Telecommunications
David M. Leive*
INTRODUCTION
Two broad trends are evident today in international satellite telecommuni-
cations. The first is a trend towards greater international regulation of the
natural resources involved, the radio frequency spectrum and the geosta-
tionary satellite orbit. The second is a trend towards international and
regional groupings in the provision of communications services among
countries. Other articles in this volume discuss various aspects of one or
the other of these trends, such as the 1985/1988 Space WARC, and region-
al satellite developments in Europe. Consequently, no attempt is made
here to analyze the two trends fully. The principal point of this paper is
to analyze their interrelationship and to demonstrate that the two trends
are divergent and often contradictory.
While attempting to exercise greater control over scarce resources, the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) continues to recognize
only nation states as the relevant actors to be regulated. By contrast, the
actual provision of service is becoming increasingly organized on an inter-
national or regional basis. Consequently, the actual users of the regulated
resources are often not individual states but groupings of states. The
regulatory regime has not yet adequately recognized or adjusted itself to
these new institutional configurations.
THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY TREND
The basic issue that has always confronted the ITU has been how to
apportion a relatively scarce natural resource-the radio frequency spec-
trum-among competing nations with divergent service requirements.
* David M. Leive is the Legal Advisor to the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (INTELSAT).
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This problem antedates the advent of communications satellites and the
resulting issues concerning the use of another scarce resource-the geosta-
tionary synchronous orbit (GSO). The regulatory orientation of the ITU
is almost exclusively towards those nation states that constitute its mem-
bership. These are the actors whose conduct it regulates and these are the
entities who are granted the right to use the natural resources in question.
This is but a reflection of the general view of the international community
as being made up of individual member states.
The ITU has traditionally taken a laissez-faire approach to regulation,
although that approach has been gradually evolving over the past decade
to involve more planning. I The traditional approach has consisted essen-
tially of two steps. First, the member states decide, in general radio confer-
ences, to "allocate" the radio frequency spectrum among different
communications services. Such decisions are not, of course, exclusively
technical, but are also based on political and economic factors. 2 Second,
since the allocations are made to services and not to individual states, it
is then necessary to determine which member states have a right to estab-
lish communications services within these allocations. This has tradition-
ally been done on a first-come, first-served basis, by means of an elaborate
notification and registration process with the International Frequency
Registration Board (IFRB), one of the organs of the ITU. 3 This traditional
approach was first applied to space communications systems at the 1971
WARC. 4
The traditional first-come, first-served approach has come increasingly
under attack, particularly by the Third World countries which now consti-
tute the great majority of the ITU membership, as unfairly depriving them
of access to the natural resources because of their "latecomer" status. s
Although, as indicated above, the 1971 Space WARC generally adopted
the first-come, first-served approach, it also created an elaborate process
of prior mutual consultation between ITU members in an effort to accom-
modate later entrants, and adopted resolutions emphasizing the need for
equitable access. 6 Moreover, even the first-come, first-served approach as
applied by the 1971 WARC did not grant any permanent right to the use
of an orbital location; rather, the right depended on the specific technical
characteristics of the particular satellite registered, and if those characteris-
tics changed, the user would lose his priority status. Because satellite
technology is evolving rapidly and satellites are frequently replaced by
more advanced models, the practical result is that the priorities afforded
by the first-come, first-served approach are quite limited in time.
The 1977 WARC went a step further in protecting latecomers by adopt-
ing a plan for the broadcasting satellite service, applicable worldwide
except for the Western Hemisphere, in which each ITU member was
allotted specific orbital locations and associated frequencies which it could
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use in providing broadcasting satellite services. 7 In a sense, this was not
a total break with the past since, particularly in Europe, detailed plans for
high frequency (HF) broadcasting had been in force for some time. More-
over, the potential use of satellites for international direct broadcasting to
home receivers raised cultural and political issues not found to the same
degree in the more traditional international communications services
which now go via satellite-telephone, data, relay, and television transmit-
ted through government controlled national "gateways." 8
Subsequent to 1977, the issue has been whether a plan along the lines
of the 1977 Broadcasting Plan should be adopted for the fixed communica-
tions satellite services described above. This was a chief focus of debate
at the 1979 WARC: whether to retain the traditional approach or adopt
some form of centralized planning in which the GSO would be parcelled
out to ITU members. The outcome was a decision to hold a two-part
conference in 1985 and 1988; first, to agree on which services are to be
planned and the planning principles that should be applied to the use of
the GSO, and second, to adopt detailed procedures to implement the
adopted principles. 9
At one end of the range of possibilities now being considered is the
adoption of an a priori plan, in which each ITU member would be assigned
specific locations and frequencies for its exclusive use in establishing its
own communications systems. In this way, its proponents believe, each
ITU member would be assured access to the scarce natural resource. At the
other end of the range would be the continuation of the present approach.
Between these two extremes are other methods, including shorter term a
priori plans, regional plans, and mechanisms for periodic review and incor-
poration of countries' needs. While it is difficult to predict the outcome,
it seems likely that, at a minimum, there will be some movement away
from the present approach in the direction of a greater degree of planning.
All of the above alternatives retain a nearly exclusive orientation toward
the ITU's individual member states, based on the fact that, until recently,
communications services have been provided by individual states normal-
ly subject to the ITU's jurisdiction.
THE INTERNATIONAL PROVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
Until the advent of communications satellites in the mid-1960s, interna-
tional communications were carried by HF radio and undersea cables.
Neither means required any elaborate institutional arrangements above the
bilateral level. The characteristics of communications satellites, however,
led to different arrangements. By its nature, a satellite in geosynchronous
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orbit is visible from one-third of the earth's surface, and thus many coun-
tries could communicate with each other via the same satellite. Conse-
quently some form of multilateral arrangement was necessary. Moreover,
as early as 1961, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution concern-
ing the peaceful uses of outer space, urging that the benefits of the new
technology be made available to all countries. 10 These considerations laid
the basis for the international provision of communications satellite ser-
vices as reflected in the establishment in 1964 of the International Tele-
communications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT). 11
In the following two decades, INTELSAT has grown to 108 member
states, and, through its satellites, carries more than two-thirds of all inter-
continental communications services: telephone, television, telex and other
data services. It also provides domestic communications services to more
than twenty countries. Of equal importance, INTELSAT has evolved
elaborate mechanisms for planning, technical and operational coordination
and consultation, and decision-making.
INTELSAT is governed by two international agreements: the agreement
setting forth the basic provisions, principles and structure of the organiza-
tion, signed by governments through their foreign ministries, 12 and an
operating agreement setting forth more detailed financial and technical
provisions and signed by the governments or their designated telecom-
munications entities. 13 In most cases, these signatories are the ministries
of communications of the countries concerned, but in some cases they are
quasi-public or private entities under varying degrees of governmental
control or supervision.
INTELSAT's structure contains three representative organs which re-
flect this distinction between political and technical representation. First,
the Assembly of Parties, which meets every two years, is composed of all
states party to the Agreement and is primarily concerned with "those
aspects of INTELSAT which are primarily of interest to the Parties as
sovereign States." 14 Decisions are taken on a one-country, one-vote basis,
and the principal representation is provided by the foreign ministries.
Second, the Meeting of Signatories, which meets annually, is composed
of all the signatories to the Operating Agreement, and is primarily con-
cerned with financial, technical, and program matters of a general nature. 15
It is empowered to take certain specified decisions of a general nature in
these areas, such as raising the capital ceiling and establishing general
principles for utilization charges. Decisions are taken on a one-country,
one-vote basis, and representation is provided by the signatories, for the
most part, communications ministries. Thus, it is more technically and
operationally oriented than the Assembly of Parties.
Third, the Board of Governors, which meets at least four times a year,
is the organ with the basic responsibility to take decisions covering the
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design, development, establishment, operation and maintenance of the
space segment. 16 It is composed of governors representing signatories with
a certain minimum investment share, singly or in combination, and, with
certain limitations, governors representing at least five or more signatories.
Decisions are taken by weighted vote, each governor casting a vote equiva-
lent to his signatory's investment share. The representatives of the signato-
ries to the Board of Governors are officials concerned, in their home
countries, with the operation and management of the satellite system, and
they generally have a management, technical, or financial background. The
Board, in turn, is assisted by several advisory committees covering techni-
cal, financial, and planning matters, and these groups are comprised of
specialists from their respective signatory organizations.
Some of the same underlying considerations that led to the creation of
INTELSAT have also led to the establishment of other international and
regional organizations, some modeled after INTELSAT. On the interna-
tional level there is the International Maritime Satellite Organization (IN-
MARSAT), 17 a sister organization to INTELSAT responsible for maritime
communications services, and Intersputnik,1 8 an international satellite
system established by the Soviet Union. On the regional level, there are
European organizations and satellite systems such as EUTELSAT and the
European Communications Satellite (ECS), 19 ARABSAT, composed of
more than twenty Arab states, and the PALAPA system providing service
to the five ASEAN states. 20 This increasing trend towards regional systems
is also based on other factors: certain common regional and political inter-
ests, a desire by various countries to promote the growth of their aerospace
industries, and the economies of scale which result from sharing the very
high costs of establishing satellite systems.
It would not, however, be entirely accurate to say that the trend is
entirely in the direction of both international and regional systems. There
has also been a proliferation of domestic satellite systems established by
individual countries either to supplement terrestrial networks (as by the
United States, Canada, and France, for example) or to provide communica-
tions services where none previously existed (as by Brazil, Australia, and
Mexico). It should be noted that some of these systems are also being used
for transborder or regional services. The growing tendency towards prolif-
eration of different satellite systems, both domestic and regional, raises a
series of basic policy issues concerning the future relationship of such
systems with each other and with the INTELSAT system. These issues,
however, are distinct from, even though related to, the main focus of this
paper and will not be addressed here.
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO TRENDS
The ITU trend toward greater regulatory control, leading to the 1985/1988
Space WARC, involves regulation of the conduct of individual member
states, but international communications increasingly are provided by
groups of states. This inconsistency could lead to serious anomalies. For
example, how would the services provided by INTELSAT be affected if the
ITU were to adopt an a priori plan which distributed the GSO and associat-
ed frequencies only to members of the ITU? Would INTELSAT have to
"sublease" the many orbital locations it needs from those ITU members
holding them? Alternatively, if the 1985/1988 Conference does not adopt
an a priori plan but rather, say, short term plans adopted at periodic plan-
ning conferences, what would INTELSAT's role be at such conferences and
how would the service requirements of its members be accommodated? It
is easier, of course, to raise these questions than to provide answers, but
an effort needs to be made to identify and address the problems. We can
begin by outlining some of the present interrelationships between these
two divergent trends.
First, because the detailed ITU regulatory regime applies to the use of the
GSO, international organizations must observe the various ITU rules, and
practical accommodations must be devised, such as those that currently
exist between the ITU and INTELSAT. For example, the INTELSAT sys-
tem provides international communications services to more than 130
countries. The facilities providing these services must comply with the ITU
rules, to which the INTELSAT members are individually bound, and yet
it is the organization itself which, by its charter, has the responsibility for
planning, providing and operating the facilities, which includes selecting
the orbital locations, frequencies, and other operating characteristics of the
satellites. 21 These practical realities have been reflected in INTELSAT's
adoption of a procedure whereby it is deemed to act on behalf of its
members in conducting intersystem coordination with other countries
under the ITU rules, and in complying with the ITU's notification and
registration procedures. In the second case, because the ITU recognizes
only member states, INTELSAT has authorized the United States Govern-
ment to act on its behalf as a "post-office" in the filing process. In the case
of coordination, INTELSAT itself conducts the. complex and elaborate
consultations, and this role is accepted by the other parties involved in the
coordination (whether or not INTELSAT members) as well as by the ITU
itself. While these practical arrangements suffice under the present ITU
regime, and would undoubtedly suffice if that regime were to continue
largely unchanged, it is not at all clear that they would be adequate under
other more planned arrangements that the ITU rixight adopt at the 1985/
1988 Space WARC.
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Second, the INTELSAT and INMARSAT organizations, and some of the
regional organizations as well, already perform some of the functions and
meet some of the needs that the ITU is seeking to address at the upcoming
Conference. The developing countries objective in moving away from the
first-come, first-served approach and towards a priori planning stems from
a desire not be frozen out of the use of the GSO and to be assured that
their communications requirements will be met. The INTELSAT and IN-
MARSAT processes seek to meet these needs: their various mechanisms
and types of meetings seek to assess the precise requirements of their
members for international service (and for domestic service if they so
desire) to determine the most efficient and economical satellite facilities to
meet those requirements, and to provide non-discriminatory access to the
facilities for members and non-members alike. For example, there are
annual meetings of traffic experts from all countries using the INTELSAT
system to forecast traffic requirements for the following years, and the
INTELSAT Board of Governors, on the basis of detailed technical, plan-
ning and financial analyses by its various standing advisory subcommittees
decides what precise types of spacecraft to purchase that will best meet
these requirements. In this sense, international organizations such as IN-
TELSAT and INMARSAT provide "common user" facilities which may
constitute an effective alternative to a priori planning.
It is worth noting that, while any organization such as INTELSAT tends
to acquire an identity separate and distinct from that of its members, the
organization itself has no communications requirements; the organization
seeks to meet the requirements of its members. Thus, there should be no
conflict between the interests of a given country in, say, INTELSAT and
the ITU. Admittedly countries do not always speak with a single voice. A
government may have to reflect a range of diverse and often contradictory
interests, and, moreover, the issue of an a priori plan for the GSO has been
viewed by many developing countries as a desirable political goal quite
apart from technical or other practical considerations.
If international organizations are not regarded at the 1985 Conference
as an effective substitute for an a priori plan, though, one needs to return
to the question of what role such international organizations will play in
the regulatory system eventually adopted. The purpose here is not to
propose any solutions, but rather to identify the problem and sketch out
several possible ways of approaching it.
If an a priori plan were to be adopted, international organizations could
be accomodated in various ways. First, certain international organizations
could be placed in the same category as member states and allotted specific
orbital locations, associated frequencies and coverage areas. This approach
would reflect most accurately the present day realities, even though it
would also constitute a substantial departure from the present ITU regula-
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tory approach. Moreover, the approach would require a determination of
which international and/or regional organizations the ITU should recog-
nize. This definitional problem, however, would be no more difficult than
those involved in the other planning approaches proposed. One possibility
would be to recognize in the plan only those international organizations
which themselves operate communications satellite systems. The rationale
for this limitation is that such organizations with a direct responsibility for
operating a system should be appropriately recognized. Moreover, there
would be very few international organizations which would fall into this
category; such organizations as UNESCO or OECD would not qualify.
Finally, under this approach it would be necessary to define the types
of communications services the recognized international organizations
would provide at particular orbital locations; for example, a given location
may be most desirable for providing international service, while another
may be most useful in providing domestic or maritime service. Given the
wide range of services that can be provided by a satellite at a single
location, and the ability of international organizations to provide a range
of these services, it cannot simply be assumed that international organiza-
tions should be limited to specific locations exclusively for international
use.
An alternate way to accommodate international organizations under an
a priori plan would be to have a single ITU administration designated as the
"agent" representing a particular international organization. For example,
the orbital location 332.5* East longitude could be assigned to a particular
ITU member with the provision that that member represent INTELSAT.
A variation on this approach would be for the specific orbital location to
be assigned to all the members of, say, INTELSAT, for use by the organiza-
tion. There is, of course, a certain artificial element to these procedural
devices, but such devices may prove of some value should there be an
unwillingness to utilize the more direct approach described -above. While
such approaches would be a continuation of the present arrangement
described above, it would also require, of course, that the 1985/1988 Con-
ferences identify those specific orbital slots to be used by a recognized
international organization. As noted earlier, this would be a difficult task,
and is part of the larger problem that any a priori plan poses; that is, how
to decide which locations, associated frequencies and coverages should be
assigned to particular countries and for what services.
A third possibility might be that an a priori plan could be adopted that
does not explicitly address the question of how the requirements of inter-
national organizations would be satisfied. Under such an approach, orbital
locations would be assigned solely to member states, and it would be left
to the member states and the international organizations concerned to
work out arrangements by which the organizations could use particular
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slots. This approach, while requiring the least departure from the present
ITU regulatory regime, suffers from the greatest failure to recognize
present day realities. Moreover, INTELSAT currently has registered on
behalf of its members approximately sixteen locations. How, as a practical
matter, would the 1985/1988 Space WARC give adequate recognition to
the services being provided by the INTELSAT satellites at those locations?
If a long-term a priori plan is not adopted, the problems are less severe
but remain nonetheless. If a shorter term plan were adopted, it would still
be necessary to decide how the communications requirements currently
met by international organizations would be satisfied. If a shorter term
plan were combined with a process of periodic conferences or similar
mechanisms to adjust needs and resources, or if such processes were adopt-
ed without a plan, it would be necessary to decide what role international
organizations should play in that process. Moreover, there is the separate
problem of how the views of international organizations would be ade-
quately recognized in an ITU conference such as the 1985 Space WARC,
which itself was organized to establish a plan and/or process.
Certain elements of the present system could provide the basis to permit
international organizations to play a direct role in whatever processes were
adopted. First, the ITU already recognizes international organizations as
eligible to participate in an advisory capacity and as observers in the work
of radio conferences and the two ITU international consultative commit-
tees dealing with radio and with telephony and telegraphy: the Consulta-
tive Committee on International Radio (CCIR) and the Consultative
Committee on International Telegraph and Telephone (CCITT). And sec-
ond, INTELSAT's role is recognized when it acts for its members in the
negotiations and consultations with other ITU members that take place to
solve intersystem coordination difficulties. Based on the ITU's present
accommodations of INTELSAT, it should be possible to develop arrange-
ments whereby certain international organizations are able to participate
adequately, in their own right and on behalf of their members, in whatever
processes or mechanisms are eventually adopted. This would assure that
the organizations' provision of communications services is recognized by
the ITU.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate that the ITU regulatory
regime does not take into account the way in which international telecom-
munications via satellite are actually provided. Some means must be found
to do so. While several alternatives have been suggested, these suggestions
are by no means exclusive. The important point is that the problem be
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recognized and that all concerned begin consideration of possible solu-
tions.
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